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Whither Corporate Russia? 
 
Abstract 
Using firm-level information obtained from RTS stock exchange over the 1998-2006 
period, we estimate growth performance of the Russian corporate sector. We find 
consistently improving growth, and note that higher growth performance is correlated 
with a higher state partial reacquisition and corporate governance presence in 
corporations. We argue the latter served to not only safeguard against 
misappropriation of firm assets and government subsidies, but also to guard against 
propensity of managers to opt for shorter than optimal investment time horizon. Thus 
the state corporate governance strategy may serve as a second best policy to a more 
developed property rights system.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we use firm-level financial data of companies listed on the Russian 
Trading System stock exchange (or RTS) to estimate corporate growth performance 
starting from the beginning of 1998 through to the end of 2006. We are particularly 
interested in identifying possible causes behind the remarkable turn-around in Russian 
corporate growth for most of this period, especially when contrasted with the previous 
decade’s severe negative growth (-14.5 percent in 1992)1. Table 2 (see further text) 
applies a standard measure of Tobin’s Q to compare average corporate growth 
performance over three sub-periods. The measure essentially captures the ratio 
between a company’s market value divided by the replacement costs of its assets, 
typically represented by the book value of its assets.  As we see from 1998-1999 
Tobin’s Q averaged just 0.357, in the period 2000-2002 it averaged 0.432 and in the 
period 2003–2006 it averaged a remarkable 0.844.  Our data set only covers a few 
years of the late Yeltsin regime, but for most of the nineties decade corporations 
experienced severe disinvestment and suffered large negative growth rates. This 
phenomenon is generally attributed to increasing proclivity, over the Yeltsin’s 
regime’s tenure of office, of inside investors, who in many cases were former state-
enterprise managers and local government bureaucrats, to engage in widespread asset 
substitution, which included the liquidation of many former state-firm assets, which 
were often transferred into illicit overseas accounts (Intriligator, 1998).  
The failure of the privatization initiative of the Yeltsin regime, and the ensuing 
Russian economic collapse that came in its wake, is widely attributed to the regime’s 
failure to initiate an effective property rights structure, which is assumed vital to 
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 See Conditions in Russia at the Outset of the Yeltsin and Clinton Administrations, 
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 encourage efficient firm level investment (Stiglitz, 2002). Moreover, the descent of 
the economy toward regionalization served only to undermine the ability of the 
central government to even enforce what regulations it had against misappropriation 
by many managers, often in alliance with regional officials of former state enterprises 
(Coffee, 1999; Fox and Heller, 2000).   
The remarkable turn-around in corporate growth, which began early under the Putin 
regime, has been largely attributed to significant subsidies, stemming from Russia’s 
substantial natural resource export earnings, received by many firms located in 
targeted industries. Undoubtedly, greatly enhanced subsidies derived from natural 
resource rents played an important part in Russian corporate revival, but it can never 
be the whole story. Recall, for example, that the Yeltsin regime had also carried out 
an investment subsidy allocation scheme to favoured firms, but as we know, severe 
negative corporate growth persisted, even for firms most favoured through generous 
subsidies. The latter most likely diverted from legitimate investment projects in order 
to personally enrich in situ managers and local bureaucrats (Rock and Solodkov, 
2001).   
Thus, an important factor for the turn-around in corporate growth must also lie 
somewhere else. The new regime had earlier introduced a wide range of nominally 
strong corporate governance reforms, such as increasing transparency and disclosure 
(Yakovlev and Osteuropa, 2003; Lazareva et al., 2007). For example, Russian firms 
acquired both ownership and corporate governance qualities similar to that of a 
Western-style firm, and a firm’s shareholders elect Western-style board of directors 
for each firm, the latter enjoying a wide latitude in determining corporate strategy 
(Porshakov et al., 2006). Even if we were to accept that the above mix of policy 
initiatives had played a role in guaranteeing outside investors against the most 
 egregious asset-stripping behaviour by inside investors that was so prevalent in the 
earlier decade, such policies would not have prevented the propensity of local 
managers and bureaucrats toward adopting a sub-optimal investment horizon. This is 
due to the continuing perceived lack of confidence in the legal property rights 
protection when it comes to the fruits of longer-term large lumpy investments 
(Woodruff, 2005; Greenspan 2008), especially when these investments projects 
receive generous state subsidies in the initial period.  
Based on the above, we argue that the Putin regime’s reversal of its predecessor’s 
strategy of disengagement from firm-level decision-making is the most significant 
factor that enhanced corporate sector growth. For example, the state became a 
substantial co-owner in just about all of the major corporations, and crucially 
exercised its option to have a significant presence within the shareholder bodies, 
particularly with corporations receiving substantial investment subsidies. The 
importance of this kind of state-private co-partnership system (SPCS) can be 
recognised as a monitoring mechanism necessary in order to protect firm-specific 
investment subsidies from expropriation by investor insiders, which was a widespread 
practice during the 1990s (Goldman, 2003; Gregory and Schrettl, 2004; Bahry, 2005; 
Dininio and Orttung, 2005; Ivanenko, 2005; Tompson, 2005). In other words, we 
argue that SPCS plays a subtle role in preventing inside investors from sub-optimally 
terminating longer-term investment projects, especially state-subsidized projects. 
Thus SPCS may serve as a second-best substitute for a more effective legal system, 
which would act to guarantee any expected income flows from any large lump-sum 
initial outlays. Asset-stripping behaviour by insiders is of course an extreme example 
of the above, but one that expropriates the investments outlays of private investors as 
well.  
 Under SPCS, firms could continue to be owned, often predominately so, by outside 
shareholders. Indeed, company shares freely trade through organized exchanges. This 
has the advantage that corporations would be able to raise capital through new share 
issues. However, under SPCS, this would be more constrained to adhere to the pre-
conditions of any subsidized state loans.   
Of course the SPCS system would not impinge on the ability of any Russian 
corporation as before under the more laissez-faire Yeltsin policy of being able to 
determine  their optimum level of output according to relatively freely determined 
market prices. However, it can be argued that the targeted subsidized investment 
system of the central government could seriously distort the optimal output mix of the 
economy. However, any state directed investment strategy is more credible the more 
certain it knows the relative productivity and technology of the overall corporate 
sector. It can be argued this would be all the more likely in the case of Russia as it can 
imitate more advanced neighbours having advanced market economies. Consequently, 
Russia could more easily estimate the level of its initial fixed investment, which 
together with an estimate of the productive technologies of the various investment 
projects, can allow the state to estimate each type of firm’s optimal investment 
duration and thereby the determination of the optimal allocation of investment 
subsidies. Thus, though the modern Russian state differs fundamentally from its 
tsarist ancestor, its investment strategy can be defined as Gerschenkron-esque.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the 
adverse effects of the privatisation initiative, which can in large part be attributed to a 
poorly-developed property rights system. Section 3 provides data description and 
summary statistics, while Section 4 interprets empirical results. Section 5 offers 
conclusions and ideas for further research.  
  
2. A faltering step toward privatization 
The catastrophic decline of Russian industrial output from the early 1990s to the turn 
of the new millennium is largely attributable to the Yeltsin regime’s badly executed 
strategy to free the nation’s industrial enterprises from its traditionally state-centred 
planning system, which, despite Gorbachev’s previously efforts, still mandated 
production quotas for all the nation’s major enterprises. The early goal was to evolve 
to a freer market-price allocation system, whereby each enterprise’s investment 
decisions would be more efficient. An important aspect of this strategy was to transfer 
state enterprise ownership into private hands. The headlong drive toward privatization 
was so rapid that by 1996, it was estimated that approximately 77.2 percent of large 
and medium size firms were acquired by private owners, and this figure corresponded 
to 88.3 percent of Russia’s industrial output (Debardeleben, 1999).  
The distributional story behind Russia’s rapid privatization of most of the former 
state enterprises is the more interesting aspect for this paper. In particular, we are 
interested how, at the beginning of our sample period, ownership of the major Russian 
industries ended up in the hands of a small elite oligarchy, despite well intentioned 
early schemes to allocate share ownership among a broad spectrum of the Russian 
public. To this end, during the early 1990s, ownership shares were allocated to the 
employees of many small and medium sized firms. Yet another scheme allocated 
vouchers to millions of ordinary Russian citizens, which were to be made convertible 
into ownership shares of various state enterprises at a later date.  Nevertheless, very 
early in the state’s privatization drive, in situ managers and local bureaucrats attained 
sizable ownership stakes of many newly privatized firms at substantially subsidised 
rates. Shleifer and Vishny attribute the success of the manager’s ownership grab to the 
 fact that top state enterprise managers were adept at bribing influential politicians, a 
practice they honed during the former Soviet system (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
Despite the fact that former managers and local bureaucrats had gained de facto 
ownership over large sections of Russian industry, their ownership remained insecure, 
perhaps not least because of the illegality in the way that they had acquired it 
(Intriligator, 1994).  For example, Hoffman (2002) describes the decade of the 1990s 
as one plagued by insider dealings, theft and extensive hidden money flows. Other 
authors have described the widespread practice during the 1990s of Russian company 
managers engaging in substantial asset-stripping of company resources (Rapaczynski, 
1996; Alexeev, 1999; Black et al., 2000; Sonin, 2000; Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 
2001). Furthermore, other authors have described how widespread managerial 
misappropriation of assets was made possible through the connivances of regional 
bureaucrats who had become increasingly powerful during this period (Robinson, 
2002). For example, regional officials exploited the existing differences in public 
spending initiatives and even competed to assign regional ‘property rights’ over many 
enterprises, allowing them to win control over many firms through locally run shares 
auctions, which were rigged to exclude outside bidders (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005).  
As many authors have argued, the severe asset-stripping behaviour of the rising 
oligarchs was a predictable consequence due to the absence in Russia of an adequate 
property rights system (Stiglitz, 2002). An efficient property rights system would 
ensure that each asset owner enjoys the correct bundle of rights to effect that all assets 
are allocated to their highest valued uses (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Alchian, 
1977).  This of course includes the right to be freely traded, and Alchian points out 
that this definition is sufficient to prevent utilization of any assets such that may 
generate any form of externality (Alchian, 1977; Alchian and Allen, 1977).   
 The above abstract definition has spawned a wide range of literature specifying 
conditions when property rights systems might fail. One well known application 
relates to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, which can arise in markets of 
incomplete information. In this tradition, the corporate finance literature has identified 
costs associated with a wide variety of management monitoring failures afflicting the 
modern Western corporation (Harris and Raviv, 1991).  However, transaction costs 
arising from moral hazard and adverse selection problems are generated each period 
under some ongoing contractual relationship between managers, shareholders and 
bondholders. As this type of problem creates flow costs, it fails to capture the 
magnitude of the moral turpitude of the rising Russian oligarchy of the period to grasp 
the lion’s share of Russia’s vast corporate asset base.   
Perhaps of more applicability to the Russian situation of the period is the set of 
problems generated under an inefficient property system that gives rise to hold-up 
costs. High hold-up costs can arise when one side of an agreement can act to prevent 
the application of a jointly owned asset in such a way as to reduce its value. Klein et 
al. (1978) and Williamson (1979) identify that hold-up costs can arise under an 
incomplete contract requiring a high degree of asset specificity. But we can apply the 
theory to better understand the behaviour of the emerging Russian oligarchs also. 
Through their widespread misappropriation of firms’ assets, managers succeeded in 
undermining the value of the company shares and vouchers held by millions of 
workers and the larger Russian citizenry. In addition, Russian citizens were also 
encouraged to sell their vouchers more cheaply due to economic hardship, which of 
course was a direct consequence of the severe disinvestment due to extensive asset-
stripping behaviour by the very managers buying vouchers. Thus vouchers worth 
10,000 roubles eventually traded at 60 percent discount as ordinarily investors became 
 dubious in regard to the size of any income derived from voucher ownership 
(Broadman, 1999).  
Corresponding to the level of disinvestment dynamic state finances also 
deteriorated and by the mid 1990s the central government was forced to adopt drastic 
measure to find income. One such measure was the 1995 ‘loans for shares’ scheme, 
whereby banks and similar institutions advanced loans to the government, with many 
of the nation’s largest state-enterprise shares acting as collateral.  During the period, 
many large private banks were actively engaged in diverting resources to favoured 
industries and individuals, eschewing to simply play the traditional financial 
intermediary role. It is claimed that the participating private banks were controlled by 
friends of many prominent politicians of the regime (Thomson, 2002; Spicer and Pyle, 
2003). As the government proved incapable of reversing its fortunes in regard to 
falling revenue, it inevitably defaulted on its bank debt. Consequently the state 
enterprise shares held by the banks as collateral were sold by auction. As the number 
of accepted participating bidders in the share auctions was extremely restricted to a 
class of investors all of whom were on familiar terms, unsurprisingly shares traded at 
artificially low prices (Dyck, 2002; Puffer and McCarthy, 2003).  
With the completion of the auction, and their recent  acquisition of the vouchers, 
the managerial class in alliance with elements of the old state bureaucracy now held 
title to the  most desirable and important  enterprises of the country. The ‘new breed’ 
of business leaders – new elites, became known as the Russian oligarchs (Braguinsky 
and Yavlinsky, 2000; Shleifer and Treisman, 2005).  However, the legal title of the 
oligarchs over their former state enterprises remained  politically insecure (Clarke and 
Kabalina, 1995; Nellis, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004).  Thus, it of little 
surprise, that once capital funds became freely exportable through a complicit private 
 banking system, the period saw capital flight out of Russia (Wintrobe, 1998; Ross, 
2004).  
Thus, as already stated above, the Putin regime formed SPCS in order to avoid the 
“grabification” processes of the 1990s. By forming a co-ownership system with 
private investors, the federal government may significantly reduce high hold-up costs, 
as the new SPCS can act as an effective monitoring mechanism to more assure private 
investors of their expected return. The co-partnership system, which is currently 
evolving in Russia, lies somewhere between complete state ownership of corporations 
as in the old Soviet Union, and the disastrous ‘laissez-faire’ system, which existed 
during the Yeltsin era, but operated with incomplete claims over assets. Our 
hypothesis suggests that firms are likely to exhibit superior performance and growth 
prospects if they have adopted the new state-private co-partnership system, which can 
assure long-term expected return on investment.  
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology and description of variables 
The aim of this research is to measure any effect of the state-private co-partnership 
system introduced by the early Putin regime. We look at firm performance as well as 
possible growth prospects. Our regression takes the following form, where X1 
denotes ownership type, while X2 represent a number of control variables: 
 
 Yit = β0 + β1X1it + β’2X2it  + εit                                                                         (1) 
 
Our analysis employs a random effects panel regression on the RTS annual firm-level 
data, obtained from company financial statements available on SKRIN database for 
 the period of 1998-2006.
2
 The dataset is comprised of 329 companies, which is a 
complete sample of firms listed on the RTS stock exchange. However, due to the 
absence of information, the final sample was reduced to 253, resulting in 1,737 
observations.
3
  
The dependent variable in this study is Tobin’s Q, which is a measure of 
company’s corporate growth performance. We specifically chose Tobin’s Q over 
return variable due to potential problem associated with the latter measure, which 
reflects short-term opportunism instead of long-term performance. In other words, we 
believe that shareholder’s return may not be an appropriate variable to absorb asset-
stripping behaviour. Tobin’s Q can be calculated by dividing the market value of 
outstanding stock and debt by replacement value of production capacity. However, in 
this paper, we proxy Tobin’s Q as the sum of book value of debt and market value of 
equity, divided by total assets (Chen et al., 2005; Fama and French, 2005; Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 2006).  
The key explanatory variable of interest is the effect on company growth 
performance after it was partially re-acquired by the central government. We have 
designated this variable as SPCS as it is meant to capture the effect of the state’s 
presence in a specific company as a major shareholder and its active involvement in 
company’s governing board. The effect is captured by a state re-acquisition dummy 
variable, which is given a value of 1 if the firm has adopted the new SPCS, where the 
state has re-instated itself as one of the major shareholders to the firm under the Putin 
administration, and 0 otherwise. Russia’s key shareholders were identified from 
                                                 
2
 All financial data was recorded at the end of the trading year. A Hausman test was used to determine 
if a fixed or a random effects model was suitable. The test showed that the null hypothesis of both 
estimation methods yielding similar coefficients was not rejected, hence the random effects model was 
used as it produced more efficient estimators 
3
 Because of the missing observations for both at least one time period and at least one entity, we have 
an unbalanced dataset 
 company annual or quarterly reports (we have also acknowledged a number of firms 
in which the central state held shares indirectly). Although company reports disclose 
all shareholders who own 5 or more percent of capital, and we classify an owner who 
holds more than 5 percent of company’s stock as a “major shareholder”, we find that 
Russian corporate ownership is defined by a high concentration level, where the 
average fraction of capital held by the principal shareholder is approximately 50 
percent. 
We also use several dummy variables to take account of the effect of other 
types of largest shareholder. For example, to capture the difference between state 
ownership and state re-acquisition, we introduce a dummy variable for “continuous” 
state ownership. We employ “continuous” state ownership variable in order to 
highlight the new government strategy of a central state-private investor partnership 
associated with the re-acquisition variable, while “continuous” state ownership simply 
reflects government control of the firm over the period.  In this case, we recognize the 
central state as the continuous principal owner if the government is the only major 
shareholder over the period, when under the co-ownership system, the government 
and a private investor are both principal owners.
4
 Similarly, using the equivalent 
method, we assess the influence of regional state and foreign investor. 
We also include a number of control variables to capture other firm 
characteristics which can influence firm performance. For example, as firm growth is 
affected by its size, we include the proxy of natural log of total assets (Salancik and 
Pfeffer, 1980; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Faccio et al., 2001). Similarly, as the level of 
firm debt is generally recognised as impacting firm growth, we include a commonly 
accepted proxy for leverage. This is the ratio of book long-term and short-term debt to 
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 We use the term “continuous” to signify that the state remained the largest shareholder, and            
    SPCS was not introduced 
 total assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Lang et al., 1996; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998). 
As we are more interested in long-term growth than in the short-term performance of 
the firm, we do not include short-term debt in our leverage proxy. This measure has 
an advantage in that it will more accurately pick-up the effect on firm growth due to 
subsidised long-term loans from the state to favoured firms. These loans represent 
natural resource rents, which are being actively channelled to many industries 
(Vdovichenko and Voronina, 2006; Hanson 2007).  
Finally, we include a few other measures. As the level of firm profitability is 
known to affect firm growth, we include the net profit before interest and taxes, 
divided by sales variable. This follows the method employed by Machin and Van 
Reenen (1993), Schranz (1993) and Loughran and Ritter (1997). In addition, as the 
age of a firm can affect its growth performance, we include a longevity dummy 
variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the firm has operated for at least 10 years 
prior to economic restructuring policy, and 0 otherwise. Finally, to measure the 
potential effect on firm growth of ownership concentration, we include a proxy of the 
percentage of capital owned by the largest shareholder variable.  
Table 1 offers a summary description of variables used in our regression 
analysis.  
                                            [insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the number of firms trading on the RTS that are included in the 
sample over the period beginning in 1998 through to the end of 2006. For 
comparative purposes, the dataset is sub-divided into three periods of interest. In each 
period, the size of the sample is noted, and for each of the relevant variables of 
 interest to our study, the sample mean, standard deviation, the maximum and 
minimum values and skewness are reported.  
                                            [insert Table 2 here] 
The years 1998 and 1999 (Panel A) cover the ending period of the Yeltsin regime and 
correspond with the mature effects of its privatization policy. The subsequent period 
comparative statistics, reported in Panel B, covers the period from the beginning of 
2000 through 2003. This period spans the formative years of the Putin regime, when 
the regime introduced many changes of its important corporate and industrial policy 
initiatives. Lastly, Panel C allows us to compare the relevant statistics of the more 
mature Putin regime over the period from the beginning of 2003 through 2006.   
Panel A clearly exhibits statistics consistent with the overall poor economic 
performance of Yeltsin’s ‘laissez faire’ policy. Unsurprisingly, during this period, the 
overall number of listed firms is low and the average Tobin’s Q value is particularly 
low. It also picks up the August 1998 financial crisis. Panel B indicates noticeable 
improved corporate performance – Tobin’s Q grew steadily and there was notably 
increased profitability. Finally, Panel C indicates a dramatic improvement in the 
Tobin’s Q for a list of firms, signalling superior company performance as well as 
corporate growth. Interestingly, we also note a sharply increasing standard deviation 
of Tobin’s Q variable over the given period, which signals of a wide variation in firm 
corporate growth performance. This may also indicate that investors’ confidence in 
certain business sectors has increased dramatically. More importantly, we see that 
positive skewness has also been increasing rapidly, which demonstrates that more and 
more firms have exhibited superior growth performance over the period. 
 Significantly, the proportion of long-term debt in firm capital structure has 
also been increasing over time (the mean has almost doubled from 0.033 in the first 
 period to 0.064 in the last period). This is consistent with the regime’s policy of 
providing subsidized bank loans to finance targeted investment projects and firms 
actively employing such long-term loans in their capital structure. The size ratio 
gradually declined over the 1998-2006 time period. This, however, can be explained 
by a steady firm formation, where companies, which are not characterized by large 
fixed assets, entered the market (for example, service firms). Firm profitability mean 
has also increased from 0.080 in the initial period to 0.096 in the final period. We 
argue that firms generally benefited from energy sector rents being redistributed to 
other economic sectors under the new regime, and the new state-private co-
partnership system effectively preventing managers and local bureaucrats siphoning 
off firm profits, allowing firms to reach their growth and profitability potential. 
Finally, the level of ownership concentration in Russia remained high throughout the 
given period.  
Lastly, Table 3 below summarizes the number and type of largest shareholders 
present across Russia’s corporate sector between 1998 and 2006.  
                                                            [insert Table 3 here] 
In Table 3, ‘state’ ownership corresponds to a number of companies in which the 
government held a majority stake throughout the given period.
5
 Significant presence 
of state shareholder is attributed to a large number of electricity companies in the firm 
sample, which are the subsidiaries of the United Energy Systems of Russia (where the 
state is the largest investor), trading on the RTS. The increasing number of such 
companies is consistent with the restructuring of RAO Unified Energy Systems in 
2005 and 2006. 
                                                 
5
 The identification of major shareholders mechanism is outlined in Subsection 3.1 
 The private investors in the new SPCS firms are, in general, in the form of 
financial institutions or other corporations. Central state usually participates through 
direct or indirect holdings. For instance, from 2002 onwards, the government owned 
shares in many enterprises through financial institutions, in which it had partial 
control. It is evident from the table that since the advent of the Putin regime, the 
number of firms characterised by the state-private co-partnership mechanism 
increased dramatically. This development is consistent with the government’s strategy 
of regaining major control over the Russian industry.  
The ‘non-state ownership’ status describes firms without central state presence 
in their ownership structure. We identify four types of private owners – domestic 
corporation or financial institution, foreign corporation or financial institution, 
individuals and regional state. It is important to note that approximately 80 percent of 
corporate ownership structure is represented by two or more large investors (for 
example, the firm is owned by a foreign corporation and a domestic financial 
institution). Such combination of shareholders accounts for a relatively high number 
of domestic and foreign participants in the market. We also note the decline in 
regional government investor type in the latter period. This is consistent with the new 
policy of corporate control being transferred back to the federal government. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The effect of SPCS on firm Tobin’s Q 
Table 4 presents results from the regression analysis. From our findings (columns 1-4) 
we note that the state re-acquisition variable has a relatively large positive effect on 
firm Tobin’s Q, even when we take account of trend oil prices.6 This is consistent 
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 See robustness test further in the text 
 with our hypothesis that SPCS has a favourable impact on firm growth performance, 
as the adoption of SPCS is received positively by investors. Our result is also 
consistent with the findings of Chernykh (2004), who believes that private-state 
cooperation has improved company performance. The author attributes this to 
enhanced monitoring mechanism, even though such a monitoring mechanism can be 
accomplished in other less costly ways. Significantly, for example, continuous state 
ownership, regional state ownership and foreign ownership do not affect firms’ 
Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, the continuous state ownership variable coefficient is 
negative but small in magnitude. The negative sign can be rationalised by the fact that 
continuous state ownership dummy variable picks up the poor growth performance of 
traditional firms during the period of economic stagnation, as well as the improved 
performance of such firms in the later years. We also find that the regional state 
ownership variable has a substantial negative coefficient in regressions. However, the 
variable is insignificant. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that if 
anything, regional government ownership hinders improved corporate growth 
performance.  
Contrary to other studies, we find that foreign ownership has no significant 
effect on firm performance. However, Yudaeva et al. (2003) found that foreign firms 
tended to be more efficient than their domestic counterparts during Russia’s 
privatization process. Carlin et al. (1995) found that firms in Russia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Bulgaria benefited from major foreign-run investment programs during 
the early transition period. Smith et al. (1997) had similar results for Slovenia. But 
domestic and foreign entities should find it equally difficult to maintain an advanced 
corporate governance code in an environment characterised by insecure property 
rights. This is consistent with our results.  
 We find that firm’s long-term debt is positively associated with its Tobin’s Q. 
The magnitude of the long-term debt variable coefficient has an average of 1.358, and 
the variable is significant at 1 percent level. With the advent of the Putin regime, 
financial institutions are used as conduits for subsidized loans, where state subsidies 
take the form of direct funds as well as subsidised credit interest rates or credit 
guarantees (Vedev, 2008). Thus we should expect a positive effect on firm growth 
performance the higher the level of long-term bank loans, which is consistent with our 
results. This investment strategy is also consistent with Russia’s tradition. The present 
system has the Central Bank of Russia regulating all commercial banks through a 
system of licensing investment funds to every credit institution. Consequently, 
targeted (especially large) firms are now financed through government-influenced 
loans. Our results find that firm size, which is measured by the natural log of total 
assets, does not affect firm growth performance. This finding highlights that while 
larger fixed assets (which account for the bigger proportion of assets in our size 
measure) generate higher future cash flows, they are also subject to higher potential 
hold-up costs.  
We find that profitability has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q. This is consistent 
with findings of many studies documenting a favourable market reaction to positive 
earnings announcements. For instance, Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998) 
show that investors tend to over-react to a series of good news, even if only in the 
short-term period. The positive effect of earnings on growth is found to be more 
widespread in countries with a well-defined legal system, which is characterized by 
superior insider trading regulations and strong shareholder protection (DeFond et al., 
2007). Bhattacharya et al. (2000) believe that unrestricted insider trading can lead to 
all information being absorbed into stock prices prior to the actual announcement, 
 hence no positive effect of earnings on growth. But in the Russian case, our positive 
finding may be attributed to the fact that the Russian capital market is freer of insider 
dealing because of the SPCS governing mechanism. 
Our results also indicate that the degree of ownership concentration has a 
significant but slightly positive effect on firm Tobin’s Q. The finding is consistent 
with a view that ownership concentration may act to prevent wealth tunnelling. 
Consistently, Xu and Wang (1999) also find a strong positive correlation between 
ownership concentration and profitability in China, and Joh (2003), using a large 
dataset of 5,829 Korean firms during the 1993-1997 period, finds that low ownership 
concentration tends to lead to low profitability.  
Our results show that Tobin’s Q measure of performance is adversely affected 
by firm longevity. The longevity parameter estimate is both large (-0.954) and 
significant. This, as it first appears, may be unsurprising, given that ‘old’ firms 
generally tend to exhaust any growth opportunity (Evans, 1987a, 1987b; Variyam and 
Kraybill, 1992). However, as many ‘old’ Russian enterprises (for instance, utility) 
received substantial investment funds over the sample period, the negative effect is 
nonetheless surprising. But it can be rationalised by the fact that longer-lived firm 
dummy variable in the sample was adversity impacted by the early disastrous 
privatisation process and August 1998 crisis.  
                                            [insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
As a first robustness check, we incorporate the natural log of oil prices variable to 
measure the direct effect of increased energy prices on Tobin’s Q for the whole 
corporate sector portfolio over the sample period. Unsurprisingly, oil prices had a 
 significant impact. The variable coefficient in column (5) has a value of 0.578 and is 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. We also note the increase in R-squared and 
Wald chi-squared values when oil prices are included. Significantly, we find that oil 
prices do not explain the whole improved Tobin’s Q statistic, and the oil price effect 
inclusion only resulted in a small fall of state re-acquisition coefficient size and its 
level of significance. Consequently, the SPCS plays an important role in Russian 
corporate growth. 
We next incorporate a time trend effect. From column (6) we see that with the 
time effect inclusion, the state re-acquisition variable is still positive and statistically 
significant at 5 percent level, even when time dummy variables are significant.
7
 The 
only noticeable effect is, once again, an increase in R-squared and Wald chi-squared 
values.  
Next, one must address the problem of endogeneity. In that, we must 
determine that the new corporate co-partnership system leads to higher Tobin’s Q, 
and that the state does not simply target, or ‘cherry-pick’ more profitable firms. It may 
be useful to establish whether companies, which were partially re-acquired by the 
state in period t exhibited high Tobin’s Q prior to acquisition in period t-1. Table 5 
shows the number of companies partially re-acquired by the state across nine major 
economic sectors. First, we note that the state did not primarily target energy sector 
firms, which are undoubtedly characterized by the highest growth potential given 
continually increasing energy prices during the period. It can be seen from the table 
that the state also re-acquired a significant number of utility and manufacturing firms. 
More importantly, when we compare firms’ Tobin’s Q in the period of acquisition 
with their Tobin’s Q in the period preceding it, we find that in most cases company 
                                                 
7
 Time trend is represented by year dummy variables 
 Tobin’s Q was substantially lower before SPCS was introduced. These findings signal 
that the state did not merely pursue a self-enrichment agenda by acquiring most 
profitable firms.  
                                               [insert Table 5 here] 
Significantly, in order to determine whether the adoption of the state-private co-
ownership mechanism in t-1 period leads to higher Tobin’s Q in the following period, 
we repeat the regression analysis, substituting state re-acquisition variable with its 
lagged term, which now serves as an instrumental variable. Thus we employ a Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS-IV) instrumental variable approach to address the problem 
of endogeneity, which is similar to Aschauer (1989) method of estimating causation 
between public capital and productivity.
8
 Column (7), Table 4 shows that the 
coefficient of this variable has increased to 0.568 and now is statistically significant at 
1 percent level. Therefore, it is believed that firms tend to exhibit higher Tobin’s Q by 
adopting the SPCS and the state does not ultimately target high-value companies to 
engage in predatory behaviour.  
Finally, in Table 6 we replace the Tobin’s Q estimator with the second, and 
then a third proxy. The second proxy (TQ1) is the market value of all shares plus 
book value of long term debt and the difference between current liabilities and current 
assets, divided by the total value of firm’s assets (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). The third 
proxy (TQ2) serves is a variation of the first proxy – it is the annual change in the 
above variable (delta Tobin’s Q). This variation seeks to capture the sensitivity of the 
                                                 
8
 Fearon and Laitin (2003) also address the endogeneity problem by employing lagged value of per   
   capita GDP as explanatory variable when establishing a relationship between civil war and GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 corporate value with respect to change in independent variables. For TQ2, the 
estimation equation is 
 
              dYit = β0 + β1dX1it + β’2dX2it + εit                                                                   (2) 
 
It can be seen from the table that the size variable is significant for both TQ1 and 
TQ2, while profitability variable becomes insignificant for TQ1. We also note a 
largely reduced R-squared and Wald chi-squared value for TQ2, where ownership 
concentration and firm longevity no longer affect company growth performance. 
Nevertheless, under all new proxies, our analysis seems to indicate that the SPCS has 
a positive impact on firm Tobin’s Q, which is consistent with our initial findings. 
                                                [insert Table 6 here] 
 
5. Conclusion and implications 
In this paper we argue that up to the recent financial crisis, the significantly improved 
growth performance of the Russian corporate sector is partially attributable to the 
adoption of the co-partnership system between the state and private investors. We 
argue that the SPCS acts to constrain opportunistic behaviour of corporate managers 
and local bureaucrats, both of whom have the propensity to liquidate assets before it is 
profitable to do so. Their opportunistic behaviour not only lies in the fact that Russia 
has ineffective property rights system, but also because corporate assets are often 
heavily subsidised.  
Our findings show that the new state-private co-partnership system has a positive 
impact on firm growth performance. These results indicate that private investors view 
central state’s commitments to ensuring that investors receive their expected return as 
 credible. In other words, while it can be suggested that the federal state may have the 
same non-optimal investment horizons as corporate managers or local bureaucrats in a 
relatively unstable political regime, the findings in this paper demonstrate that this is 
not the case. Private investors do not anticipate the central government to engage in 
predatory behaviour, and recognise SPCS as an effective substitute to a poorly-
defined property rights system. 
Further research issues, arising from the main proposition of this paper on the 
efficiency of the co-partnership system, should in general concentrate on a more 
“micro” level, for example, on measuring the impact on growth due to the fortuitous 
rise in energy prices. In that, one can extend the analysis by updating the dataset to 
include the period characterised by falling energy prices, and relate their adverse 
effects on the corporate sector falling growth rates across industries.  
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 Table 1. Definition of variables 
 
Variable Description 
Tobin’s Q (Vt + LTDt + STDt) / At.  The market value of equity plus book value of debt, 
divided by total assets (Fama and French, 2005; Chen et al., 2005; Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 2006). 
 
Size LnAt. The natural log of total assets. 
 
Long-term debt LTDt / At. The ratio of book value of long-term debt to total assets. 
 
Profitability Et / Salest. The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales (Machin and 
Van Reenen, 1993; Schranz, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). 
 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
Fraction of capital owned by the largest shareholder, expressed in %. 
Longevity Equals 1 if the firm had existed during the Soviet era; 0 otherwise. 
 
Continuous state 
ownership 
Equals 1 if the firm is owned by the central state directly or indirectly 
throughout the period; 0 otherwise. 
 
State  re-
acquisition 
Equals 1 if the state has re-established its position as firm’s major shareholder 
during the Putin regime; 0 otherwise. 
 
Regional state 
ownership 
 
Equals 1 if regional state is firm’s main shareholder; 0 otherwise. 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
Equals 1 if foreign corporation/financial institution is firm’s main shareholder; 
0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Summary statistics for firms trading on RTS between 1998 and 2006 
 
Variable No. of obs Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Skewness 
   
Panel A: 1998-1999 
 
    
Tobin’s Q 
 (Vt + LTDt + STDt) / At 
 
165 0.357 0.490 0.003 3.644 3.05 
Size (LnAt) 267 
 
0.669 0.179 0.066 0.976 -0.753 
Long-term debt (LTDt / At)   269 0.033 0.084 0.000 
 
0.598 
 
3.679 
Profitability (Et / Salest) 
 
139 0.080 0.418 -3.263 0.805 -5.050 
Ownership concentration (%) 270 
 
41.304 
 
17.679 
 
7.000 
 
99.990 
 
0.442 
   
Panel B: 2000-2002 
 
    
Tobin’s Q 
 (Vt + LTDt + STDt) / At 
 
379 0.432 0.555 0.001 
 
4.303 
 
3.693 
Size (LnAt) 513 
 
0.630 
 
0.207 
 
0.00002 
 
0.969 
 
-0.950 
Long-term debt (LTDt / At)   519 0.052 0.112 0.000 0.694 
 
5.923 
Profitability (Et /Salest) 
 
457 0.093 0.327 -5.159 0.904 17.380 
Ownership concentration (%) 512 43.363 17.009 6.000 99.990 
 
0.334 
   
Panel C: 2003-2006 
 
    
Tobin’s Q 
 (Vt + LTDt + STDt) / At 
 
1264 
 
0.844 
 
1.082 
 
0.001 
 
17.931 
 
4.778 
Size (LnAt) 1655 
 
0.626 
 
0.232 
 
0.0001 
 
0.999 
 
-0.780 
Long-term debt (LTDt / At)   1671 0.064 0.121 0.000 0.721 
 
2.573 
Profitability (Et /Salest) 
 
754 0.096 0.312 -3.980 0.980 11.475 
Ownership concentration (%) 1621 47.751 19.101 6.000 99.990 
 
0.437 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3. Major shareholders of firms trading on RTS during 1998-2006 
 
State ownership / 
co-ownership 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
State  
 
 
64 
 
74 
 
71 
 
69 
 
65 
 
59 
 
63 
 
80 
 
82 
SPCS 
 
6 9 17 20 20 29 25 26 45 
Non-state multi-
ownership 
         
 
Domestic 
firm/financial 
institution 
 
 
15 
 
41 
 
53 
 
54 
 
63 
 
74 
 
73 
 
70 
 
72 
Foreign 
firm/financial 
institution 
 
14 27 21 19 27 24 25 27 34 
Individual 
 
3 8 7 9 8 8 3 8 9 
Regional government 
 
8 11 11 11 10 7 4 3 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4. The effect of SPCS and other explanatory variables on firms’ Tobin’s Q 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (2SLS-IV) 
Size 
 
 
0.180 
(0.155) 
0.176 
(0.154) 
0.161 
(0.154) 
0.161 
(0.154) 
0.183 
(0.147) 
0.032 
(0.144) 
0.155 
(0.129) 
Long-term debt 
 
1.343*** 
(0.256) 
1.374*** 
(0.254) 
1.361*** 
(0.255) 
1.354*** 
(0.255) 
1.082*** 
(0.245) 
0.633*** 
(0.234) 
 
1.501*** 
(0.247) 
Profitability 
 
 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.019** 
(0.007) 
0.019** 
(0.007) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.020*** 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Firm longevity 
 
 
-0.954*** 
(0.115) 
-0.972*** 
(0.116) 
-0.947*** 
(0.116) 
-0.942*** 
(0.116) 
-0.756*** 
(0.114) 
-0.562*** 
(0.128) 
-0.917*** 
(0.083) 
Continuous state 
ownership 
 
-0.043 
(0.072) 
      
State re-acquisition  
 
 0.199*** 
(0.074) 
  0.140** 
(0.071) 
0.138** 
(0.065) 
0.568*** 
(0.156) 
 
Regional state 
ownership 
 
  -0.205 
(0.177) 
    
Foreign ownership  
 
 
 
  0.102 
(0.106) 
 
   
Oil price 
 
    0.578*** 
(0.054) 
 
  
Time effects 
 
No No No No No Yes No 
Constant 
 
 
1.124*** 
(0.156) 
1.101*** 
(0.154) 
1.119*** 
(0.155) 
1.094*** 
(0.157) 
-0.167 
(0.187) 
1.754*** 
(0.159) 
0.887*** 
(0.133) 
No. of observations 1064 1064 1064 1065 1064 1064 1017 
R-squared 0.181 0.178 0.176 0.180 0.257 0.283 0.149 
Wald chi -squared  135.44*** 141.00*** 134.17*** 133.76*** 376.24*** 528.75*** 213.50*** 
 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5. The comparison of firm Tobin’s Q prior and during the re-acquisition period 
 
Industry Firms acquired TQt-1 > TQt TQt-1 < TQt N/A 
Utility 22 2 18 2 
Metallurgy 5 0 3 2 
Energy 9 0 8 1 
Food production 1 1 0 0 
Manufacturing 20 1 17 2 
Communications 2 0 1 1 
Retail 2 1 1 0 
Transport 3 0 2 1 
Banking 1 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6 
The effect of SPCS and other explanatory variables on firms’ Tobin’s Q1 and TQ2 
 
Variable TQ1 (1) TQ1 (2) TQ1 (3) TQ1 (4) TQ2 (1) TQ2 (2) TQ2 (3) TQ2 (4) 
Size 
 
0.812*** 
(0.146) 
0.810*** 
(0.146) 
0.794*** 
(0.145) 
0.795*** 
(0.145) 
0.337** 
(0.170) 
0.354** 
(0.170) 
0.337** 
(0.170) 
0.339** 
(0.170) 
Long-term debt 
 
1.094*** 
(0.245) 
1.117*** 
(0.243) 
1.111*** 
(0.243) 
1.102*** 
(0.244) 
1.347*** 
(0.273) 
1.364*** 
(0.272) 
1.346*** 
(0.273) 
1.357*** 
(0.273) 
Profitability 
 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
Ownership 
concentration 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Firm longevity 
 
-0.970*** 
(0.108) 
-0.986*** 
(0.110) 
-0.965*** 
(0.110) 
-0.959*** 
(0.109) 
0.037 
(0.086) 
0.028 
(0.086) 
0.038 
(0.086) 
0.033 
(0.086) 
Continuous state ownership 
 
-0.043 
(0.068) 
   0.009 
(0.056) 
   
State re-acquisition  
 
 0.146** 
(0.070) 
   0.138** 
(0.069) 
  
Regional state ownership 
 
  -0.217 
(0.162) 
   -0.045 
(0.184) 
 
Foreign ownership  
 
 
 
  0.111 
(0.101) 
 
 
  -0.063 
(0.089) 
Constant 
 
0.615*** 
(0.144) 
0.595*** 
(0.142) 
0.608*** 
(0.142) 
0.583*** 
(0.144) 
0.124 
(0.085) 
0.117 
(0.080) 
0.129 
(0.078) 
0.141* 
(0.082) 
No. of observations 1088 1088 1088 1089 807 807 807 808 
R-squared 0.202 0.198 0.199 0.202 0.047 0.051 0.047 0.047 
Wald chi-squared value 144.06*** 146.32*** 143.61*** 142.73*** 40.04*** 44.17*** 40.08*** 40.59*** 
 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively 
